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Chapter 11 
 
The Privatisation of Censorship? 
Self regulation and freedom of expression 
 
Introduction: Convergence, self-regulation and freedom of expression.   
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This 
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
European Convention on Human Rights Article 10. 
 
Public policy debate concerning self-regulation of the media is deeply ambivalent. On 
one hand, public opinion in democratic states tends to support self-regulation 
enthusiastically where the alternative is regulation by the state. On the other hand, if 
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self-regulation is seen as effective, it can provoke uneasiness about ‘privatised 
censorship’ where responsibility for fundamental rights is handed over to private 
actors, many of which are centres of power in society.1 The purpose of this section is 
to place the results of research on self-regulation across media industries in the wider 
context of freedom of expression concerns.  The goal is to identify areas of conflict 
between the activities of self-regulatory bodies and freedom of expression rights, in 
order to understand the implications for freedom of expression of the restrictions on 
the content of speech that originate in the actions of those self-regulatory bodies. 
 
We will consider how freedom of speech is understood in Europe, and address the 
areas of conflict or potential conflict between self-regulation and free speech.  We 
will focus on whether imposing limits on freedom of expression via self-regulatory 
bodies is easier to justify than state regulation, and if so, with what conditions and to 
what extent limitations are tolerable in a system that takes rights seriously.2 
 
Any form of content regulation in the media industry, whether through statute or code 
of conduct, may encroach on citizens’ speech rights. Nonetheless, as it is clear in 
Article 10 of the ECHR, free speech is not an absolute, and can be balanced against 
other rights, or the rights of others.   In this chapter we examine the question of self-
regulation and freedom of expression in terms of the legal situation.3 We investigate 
the balancing of rights as carried out by self-regulatory regimes and mechanisms not 
in isolation, but as this interacts with the courts, the legislature and the executive. We 
argue that it is not possible to resolve the difficult question of speech rights and self-
regulation at a high level of legal abstraction. We look instead at policy and socio-
legal implications, for example through the analysis of the nature and extent of 
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limitations imposed by self-regulatory bodies, and considering when and if these 
bodies are regarded as ‘public authorities’- sharing the power of the state. State, 
public, and private organisations performing regulatory activities routinely balance 
the speech rights of citizens against other objectives; it is necessary to be aware of the 
detail of regulatory functions on a case by case basis.  At a higher level of generality, 
we also need to revisit fundamental principles underpinning the justifications for free 
speech protection.  A framework for evaluating the impact of self-, co- and state 
regulatory functions4 is outlined. 
 
Limits imposed on freedom of expression by self-regulatory bodies 
 
Before we consider the limits imposed on freedom of expression by self-regulatory 
bodies let us turn our attention to the various models for media content regulation 
contemplated in current frameworks of regulation in Europe.  It is important at this 
stage to note that the array of limitations placed on content varies in different models 
of regulation. Partly because of the emergence of frameworks tailored for specific 
forms of speech and modes of delivery, there exist widely different legal systems, 
ranging from prior rating and classification (film and video, video games, ISPs, 
internal self-regulatory mechanisms at broadcasters, etc.) to post-publication self-
regulation via complaints (journalistic ethics and press councils for print/online 
publications, such as the UK PCC and German Presserat; Ombudsman or readers’ 
editor systems at newspapers and other systems of accountability). Controls on 
content are set up with various goals in mind, such as protecting the reputation of 
others,5 protecting minors from harmful speech, the need to keep up standards of 
journalistic ethics or to protect consumers by making the media accountable. For the 
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most part these different models of content regulation strike quite different balances 
between free speech concerns and the degree of intervention deemed acceptable.   
 
The following historical models of content regulation based on means of delivery can 
be distinguished in EU member states: 
 
- The book model, not addressed in this study, gives all content rights to the 
communicator, and consequently, regulatory intervention in content is deemed 
undesirable. 
 
- The periodical print media model is strongly influenced by the concept of the 
free market of ideas, and so here content intervention is also deemed 
undesirable. Content regulation is based on ordinary law; above and beyond 
this, there is space for the ethical principles of the journalistic profession, 
which in turn help make the media accountable to its readership. The control 
on content via journalistic ethics is in some cases manifest as self-regulation, 
with or without a complaints commission charged with the task of 
implementing a code of conduct.  The areas covered by the code concern 
voluntary regulation.6  
 
- The European broadcast media model7 involves the strongest content 
regulation considered here. Controls are based on a broad notion of the public 
interest. The rationale is that frequencies used for broadcasting are scarce, 
therefore must be coordinated, and access not automatically granted to 
everyone. In addition to ordinary law there is close regulatory control of 
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content based on statute and an array of codes connected to the award of a 
licence. 
 
- The emerging Internet model of content regulation seems at first sight closer 
to the pure print model in EU countries, as it relies to a great extent on 
industry self-regulation by means of codes of conduct combined with technical 
controls. The model of content regulation for online news so far has been most 
similar to pure print media, but as we have seen, games, mobile, and other 
emerging variants present contrasting approaches. 
 
New technological developments continually upset and erode these regulatory models 
and as a result may prompt new settlements, changing the boundaries between self-, 
co- and public regulation. On the one hand in the broadcasting sector, statutory 
regulatory bodies find it increasingly difficult to cope with the sheer volume of 
material that they are responsible for regulating. Technical progress makes available 
new services, for example on digital and interactive platforms.8 The need to devolve 
at least part of the regulatory responsibility to the Regulatee (or to pass part of the 
control to the consumer) is particularly felt for content, where the Regulator had 
traditionally held responsibility for detailed monitoring and reporting. As we have 
seen, not only are the means of regulation under challenge, but the current 
justifications of regulation are undermined by technology, as many argue that, given 
increased volumes of media content, and higher levels of user control and choice, it 
becomes both less practical and less justifiable to have central regulatory oversight of 
content. In this context, self-regulatory codes of practice are becoming the preferred 
practical solution. 
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The acceptability of limits imposed on freedom of expression depends on the type of 
speech that is being conveyed. Not all content is treated in the same way. Commercial 
speech or “commercial statements” in the wording of the ECHR, i.e. speech whose 
main objective is the proposal of a commercial transaction, is subject to a 
considerable degree of control.9 The rationale is the potential of commercial speech 
for confusing or misleading the public. Political speech is subject to the lowest level 
of control.  The rationale here is that the ability to criticise public officials in all 
matters of public interest must be wide-ranging in order to protect the health of 
democracy.  As the European Court of Human Rights clearly expressed it in Haes and 
Gijsels v. Belgium, even unpleasant or problematic information deserves to be 
protected: 
 
… the Court reiterates that freedom of expression is applicable not only to 
“information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference but also to those that offend, shock 
or disturb the State or any section of the community.  In addition, journalistic 
freedom also covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even 
provocation.10 
 
Artistic speech is in between those two extremes.  Article 10 offers protection either 
in the case of prior control or ex post facto control. As regards the philosophical 
underpinnings of this right, both the justifications from democracy and self-fulfilment 
are deployed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, although 
the emphasis tends to be on the argument from democracy11. There is a gradation, and 
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we see that reliance by the European Court upon the justification from democracy 
made the case law less tolerant of restrictions of political expression12 while in cases 
in which freedom of expression is supported by concerns relating to self-fulfilment 
there is more scope for the member states to impose limits on freedom of expression 
(e.g. Wingrove v. UK). 
 
Functions and models of self-regulation 
 
For analytical purposes it is also important to distinguish different functions in the 
process of speech regulation. The legal traditions of liberal democracies (and hence 
the case law of the ECHR) have not applied a blanket presumption in favour of 
freedom of expression: they have adjusted both for the type of content involved, and 
for the form of regulation.  To take one example from English law, in Venables v. 
News Group Newspapers Ltd and others13 we see the High Court prioritising the 
claimants’ right to protection of their new identity over the freedom of expression 
rights of the defendant newspapers. The claimants had sought injunctions to protect 
their identities on their imminent release from detention – they were 10 years old 
when they had murdered a child.  They had grown up and hence physically changed 
since their detention and a new identity could protect them from revenge. The 
injunction was granted: a restriction a priori, as the after-publication system offered 
by print media self-regulation would not be able to offer protection in the 
circumstances. “The press code, as applied by the Press Complaints Commission, is 
not, in the exceptional situation of the claimants, sufficient protection. Criticism of, or 
indeed sanctions imposed upon, the offending newspaper after the information is 
published would, in the circumstances of the case, be too late.  The information would 
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be in the public domain and the damage would be done.  The press code cannot 
adequately protect in advance.”14 
 
Concerns with freedom of speech can be radically different according to which 
control function is being undertaken, which kinds of speech, and the means of 
delivery for that speech. In Western Europe in some cases (rating content for taste and 
decency in broadcasting for instance) we see that a society is much more comfortable 
with state or governmental organisations undertaking regulatory functions than we 
would with others (monitoring news or political content in the press for example).  
 
In the following chart the regulatory functions have been considerably simplified for 
analytical clarity. In practice many of the functions overlap. For each one, a variety of 
public, governmental, quasi-governmental and industry bodies are involved. 
Alongside the question of their role with regards to freedom of expression, and the 
balancing of public interest arguments for regulation or rights balancing freedom of 
expression, different traditions of freedom of expression place a differing emphasis on 
the relative importance of state, public, or private curtailments of those rights. 
 
[Insert Figure 11.1 near here] 
 
With the basic philosophical justifications (outlined above) in mind, it is clear that 
concerns with freedom of expression differ across the various objects of regulation. 
There are, for example, some functions of regulation more appropriately carried out 
by a body independent of both Government and the Regulatee. Other functions are 
best left to the industry board or individual providers. In the latter case it may of 
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course be necessary to define very well the standards and benchmarks of regulatory 
transparency and accountability before self-regulation can be defended. 
 
Although over-arching categories fail to capture the complexity of regulatory tools 
and regimes, in order to make sense of regulatory schemes some approaches15 have 
categorised them as either self-, co- or statutory regulation. Others16 have taken a 
more functional approach, referring for example to self-monitoring.  Categorisation 
facilitates the understanding of issues at a theoretical level; in practice, however, most 
individual media outlets operate in a complex ecology of all three main types of 
regulation. Regulatory schemes interact for example when the ratings set by an 
industry-managed self-ratings board are applied within a legal framework governing 
broadcast licenses or video retail and rental as is the norm in Europe. The Press on the 
other hand is subject to civil (or criminal) penalty for defamation, libel, obscenity, and 
hate speech and at the same time is subject to self-regulatory codes that overlap with 
some of that general law. Models of co-regulation seem to allow governments not to 
abdicate from their ultimate goal of protection of the public from harmful content. 
(NB co-regulation is generally termed “regulated self-regulation” in German 
administrative law17). 
 
This functional approach to self-regulation permits us to make explicit some policy 
concerns which are connected with the development of self-regulatory activity. Let us 
take the UK as a case study, and apply this functionalist view to regulatory activity, as 
we outline in Table 11.1. 
 
[Insert Table 11.1 near here] 
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This table is a simplification, but it helps us spell out some of the freedom of 
expression concerns that arise with convergent content self regulation, and it also 
helps us to transcend the polarised debates where those concerned with harms (e.g. 
child protection agencies) oppose those who defend free speech. We can see that the 
shift between self-, co- and state regulation is a complex one. Communications 
regulation more often than not involves elements of all three forms of regulation. 
Taking the example of internet content regulation of illegal content: legislation 
determines the scope of what is forbidden. The role of the hotline, the IWF in dealing 
with illegal content, and the particular stress and focus taken by the IWF is 
determined by the IWF itself, and content is removed by ISPs themselves. Complaints 
come mainly from the public to a hybrid industry-public board which adjudicates. 
Some aspects of this chain, for example writing the criteria for determining what 
constitutes illegal material, and setting the operational priorities for the access control 
agency should arguably be kept away from government agencies. For legitimacy 
some role for Parliament may be required.  In others, we may be more relaxed, but – 
and this is the important point – only if sufficient safeguards of transparency and 
procedure are observed. 
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The European and the American experiences 
 
As noted, the fundamental justifications for the protection of speech draw traditionally 
on three arguments – from truth, from democracy and from self-expression – which 
will have different relevance at different times19. For example, as a society we should 
be particularly concerned (and argue the point from democracy) if political speech 
regulation falls under governmental control as this would risk compromise of political 
pluralism. Governments wishing to remain in power have a very direct interest in 
closing down or controlling political debate and should not be given tools to do so. In 
the case of pre-viewing and rating of content we would have a similar caution in 
relation to political speech but case law – as with the case of Wingrove (see below) – 
tends to illustrate the fact that prior restraint is of less concern where speech is artistic 
and not political. 
 
The European tradition of free expression is enshrined in the national legal traditions 
of the countries surveyed in this study, as well as in the ECHR case law – in this 
paper we take Strasbourg to illustrate the European tradition, as a reflection of a 
“common European denominator” 20 on the matter.  Unlike the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, which prioritises freedom of speech over other 
rights21, the system of the ECHR tends to be more comfortable with the idea of 
balancing the competing rights set out in the convention, giving free speech is similar 
strength to other rights.22  
 
The American tradition, however, appears less concerned with curtailment of speech 
rights by private organisations than the European. This is illustrated by the Yahoo 
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case, which concerned the possibility of French Internet users accessing websites 
selling Nazi memorabilia hosted in the United States.  Under French law the display 
and sale of that type of merchandise is illegal. The key issue of difference between the 
legal reasoning of the courts in the US and France lies in the conception of freedom of 
expression and the acceptability of limitations on free speech. In the United States, the 
answer is to allow even more speech. The United States has repeatedly expressed free 
speech reservations against outlawing hate speech, a concern which tends to be 
viewed in less absolute terms in Europe.23 For example, the indictment in 1997 of 
Felix Somm, the head of the ISP CompuServe in Germany for failure to prevent the 
dissemination of neo-nazi material24, can be contrasted with the US Supreme Court’s 
finding that it was unconstitutional to regulate expression on Internet through the 
Communications Decency Act.25   
 
In Europe, Article 10 sets out freedom of speech as a fundamental right subject to 
restrictions “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society.”26 As a 
commentator put it, the question is often how far a member state can limit freedom of 
expression to protect third parties against damages.27  In Strasbourg the question 
therefore is about managing the tensions arising out of the applicants’ free speech 
claims over the governments’ exercise of powers that encumber those rights. In the 
adjudication of those tensions, the ECtHR indicates whether or not the burdens placed 
on free speech by the national authorities were within their “margin of appreciation”. 
Our focus in this chapter is on limitations placed on free speech by self- (and to some 
extent co-) regulatory bodies. Pre-publication restrictions are viewed with suspicion, 
particularly in a First Amendment environment. In Europe, in contrast, there is still a 
measure of censorship, in varying degrees according to countries, regarding the a 
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priori classification of films and video and also, the quite detailed control of broadcast 
content. 
 
Control over limitations placed by self-regulatory bodies: the interface between 
self-regulation and the state 
 
Speech may be restricted prior to publication or penalties/redress imposed after. It is 
expedient, given new technology and globalisation, to regulate media industries 
through private or semi-private organisations funded (and in many cases entirely 
controlled) by industry. For some, this is positive for freedom of expression, as it 
moves content regulation away from the State or government.  This view is 
particularly prevalent in US approaches to self-regulation where the First Amendment 
tradition focuses on a mistrust of state or government, and on expansive protection of 
free speech, particularly against viewpoint-based regulation.  
 
An opposing view claims that this is a narrow, negative treatment of freedom of 
expression28. In this view, industry bodies increasingly regulate not only the 
voluntarily delegated content of their funding members, but the speech – as is the case 
with ISPs – of the broader population of users. Speech could be suppressed without 
the protections that the legal system grants, had the limitation originated in the 
authorities.  Were the activities of industry bodies to take over these public functions, 
it is argued, such self-regulation would in fact constitute a direct threat to speech 
rights as it instates a so-called ‘privatised censorship’.  In these terms, the shift of 
regulatory authority to co-regulation and self-regulatory functions should be viewed 
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with suspicion, as by means of self-regulation more onerous standards may be 
imposed in the shadow of the law. 
 
Due to the increasing complexity brought about by technical progress across all mass 
media, coupled with the tendency towards devolving at least part of the content 
regulation to the Regulatee or the consumer, equally, there appears to be a trend 
towards the de-constitutionalisation of freedom of speech.  Are we in the presence of 
valid waivers to the fundamental right to free speech when parties enter into a 
voluntary self-regulatory regime?  Are we leaving public law concerns behind and 
moving into the realm of contract?  The apparent private erosion of rights granted by 
the (public) copyright law regime by means of the use of “click here” adhesion 
contracts has been noticed some time ago.29  Similarly, Lawrence Lessig warns about 
the use of (computer) code to regulate cyberspace as an “invisible regulation” which 
is harder to resist than government regulation,30 although he sees contract as less 
dangerous for rights than computer code because a court is the ultimate arbiter of 
rights set out in a contract.31  Private law prioritises the discretion of the parties.  The 
risk those authors are warning against is that the substantive choices that are being 
made in the shadow of the law appear to be the ones that are less protective of the 
values of freedom of speech or that favour too much the commercial interests of the 
industry. 
 
If self-regulation means that the parties to a system privately establish the scope of 
their legal obligations instead of government imposing them, and a regime in which a 
code of conduct or a code of journalistic ethics imposes a voluntary set of restrictions 
on an industry and on stakeholders (e.g. consumers, readers, users, etc.), this does not 
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necessarily lead to a situation in which fundamental rights are not taken seriously. If 
the result tends to be too often that parties suppress or limit speech – to an extent that 
the government may not32, or to an excessive degree – this may be an indication that 
not enough safeguards are in place and the discretion of the self-regulatory body in 
question may need to be reviewed and brought back to margins that are acceptable. 
Angela Campbell points out, for example, that in the United States self-regulation 
could be used instead of government regulation so as not to engage First Amendment 
protection (in her example, no constitutional issue arises if a station, a group of 
stations, or an industry body chooses not carry alcohol advertising.)33  If they were 
obliged by law or a statutory regulator not to carry a certain content first amendment 
challenges would be more likely.  Similarly, internet filtering software voluntarily 
introduced by providers of content and others was viewed by First Amendment 
activists as a panacea that conciliates free speech ideas with the protection of 
minors.34  
 
The tendency we observed is that in Europe self-regulatory regimes all impose more 
onerous requirements than those of ordinary law. This can be seen across the media 
industries. Where consumers can chose between different companies’ codes of 
conduct, these codes are less of a freedom of expression concern. A consumer may 
trade off some of the freedoms of choosing an ISP with a restrictive code for the 
increased security, for example. But where codes become sector-wide or cross-
sectoral, there may be increased concerns. If all ISPs operate filter level blocking 
based on a non-transparent blacklist provided by government (as the new Finnish 
code will require)35 this is more likely to chill speech. 
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For this very reason it is likely that self-regulation – particularly if it continues to 
expands its scope, as we have seen in the trends highlighted by our research – will 
come under increasing scrutiny and challenge in Europe.  If the concern is to make 
self-regulatory regimes more acceptable to all stakeholders and to the public, from the 
point of view of public interest, then it seems necessary to start viewing self-
regulation in terms of specific safeguards and measures taken to limit liability of self-
regulatory institutions themselves in the face of a challenge to their activities via 
ordinary law. A potential solution is to increase accountability to include procedural 
protection for rights (perhaps by means of court reviewability of decisions taken by 
self-regulatory bodies), or by strengthening the codes and/or the decision-making of 
those self-regulatory bodies. One possible way to achieve this would be to place them 
in the context of a co-regulatory regime where the privately-agreed limitations may be 
audited by the authorities with the specific purpose that substantive free speech rights 
are given due attention. 
 
If we consider Meiklejohn’s argument from democracy to protect free speech – the 
argument that the sovereign people have delegated a part, but not all, of their self-
government to the state authorities – we can see that self-regulation of the media can 
be placed among that realm of rights to self-government which were not delegated to 
the state. The argument for self-regulation of the media as an alternative to legislation 
means using self-regulation mechanisms (codes, bodies able to apply a code, etc.) to 
provide a framework of limitations which in turn provides a system of accountability. 
Nonetheless, a self-regulatory regime can offer protection of freedom of expression of 
newspaper editors and proprietors, broadcasters, etc. against government regulation 
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and also against those restrictions lobbied for by certain groups (e.g. protecting 
against low standards of journalism, intrusion into private life, etc.)  
 
To make sense of self-regulatory mechanisms and their codes of conduct, and to 
include issues of accountability, we therefore suggest understanding those schemes as 
if they were contractual agreements - part of the discretion enjoyed by parties in the 
realm of private law.  Parties enjoy freedom to agree to a mechanism and code.  
Admittedly, not all parties have equal bargaining power and the readership, audience 
or  users agree to abide by a self-regulatory system by a “click here” type of adhesion 
contract or by signing to in the small print of contracts with ISPs, for example.  Hence 
the heightened need for transparency, consumer protection, stakeholder involvement 
and other ways of ensuring accountability and preventing abuse.   
 
We recognise the existence of principled objections to intrusions on a fundamental 
right such as free speech, whether the intrusions result from state action or the action 
of private parties. The other side of the coin is that like any right, free speech may 
however be subject to legitimate limitations. There is agreement among writers and 
practitioners at the level of fundamental principles that the freedom of expression of 
one person could harm another and therefore curbing certain forms of expression 
ensures fair play (that certain ideas do not dominate), which in turn furthers the goals 
of free speech.36  There is agreement also at the more concrete level of the everyday 
functioning of the media that regulation is in order (for the reasons discussed in 
Chapter 2), and that the media are unlike any other regulatory object because, among 
other reasons, the media are systems of communication by which members of a 
society understand themselves and others.  In a liberal democracy the mass media also 
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fulfil the extremely important role of watchdog of the authorities.  Limitations, of 
course, need to be imposed by an authority or a private party that enjoys legitimacy, 
and following transparent procedures.  Limitations can be placed directly or 
indirectly, for example the informal influence from the authorities and threat of state 
action if nothing is done.  Examples of the symbolic manoeuvring and dialogue 
between governments and media are numerous; state involvement in ISPs ranges from 
exhortation in ministerial speeches, to direct involvement in setting up task forces. In 
Italy, the ‘voluntary’ ISP code was drafted by the Ministry of Communications. 
 
The courts and self-regulation: interface between limits imposed via self-
regulation and limits imposed by state authorities via regulation 
 
Self-regulatory institutions have to judge the limits of free speech. As an English 
court said of the UK Press Complaints Commission: “the commission has to consider 
and balance in many cases the important but countervailing freedoms of privacy and 
of expression. The Commission then has to exercise a judgement on the particular 
facts as to when the right to privacy of a complainant ends and where the freedom of 
expression of the publisher against whom the complaint is made begins”37 
 
A key question is to what extent self-regulatory bodies are likely to be challenged in 
court, in particular with regard to the standards set out in Article 10.38 In the UK as a 
the courts have generally left a great deal of room for manoeuvre to self-regulatory 
organisations. Where reviewed, their curtailment of speech is rarely overturned. But 
there is very little case law, (and none on ISPs or hotlines).  In an analogous sector, 
the press, judges have repeatedly supported the view that although the PCC could be 
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amenable to judicial review, its decisions should be left unchallenged under Article 
10.  In any case the PCC generally errs in favour of free expression in its 
adjudications and code.39   
 
Turning from the PCC to the BBFC (the self-regulatory body of the UK film industry) 
allows us to consider a case in which Article 10 was invoked. The BBFC classifies 
films with the approval of central and local government, who retain the power to 
review decisions or refuse a local showing of a film classified by the board.40  We 
should indicate that this case pre-dates the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and the 
issue whether self-regulatory bodies can be considered “public authorities” within the 
terms of the HRA.   
 
Nigel Wingrove, a London based film director, was refused a certificate by the BBFC 
for his film “Visions of Ecstasy”, deemed blasphemous (it addresses erotic fantasies 
of St. Teresa of Avila focused on the crucified Christ). Wingrove would have been 
liable to prosecution under the Video Recordings Act 1984 had the film been 
distributed. After his appeal was rejected by the Video Appeals Committee, Wingrove 
took his case to Strasbourg. Although the result may well be viewed as disappointing 
for free speech, the point we would like to highlight is procedural. The limitation 
placed on speech by the self-regulatory body here was subject to appeal to higher 
instances.  We want to illustrate with this example a case in which self-regulatory 
bodies function within a system in which it is perfectly possible to challenge the 
balance of rights performed by those bodies. It is not a situation of privatised 
censorship without further recourse. It remains to be seen if other bodies exercising a 
semi-judicial function are open to similar challenge. ISP associations, hotlines and 
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individual ISPs are currently protected by a limited liability regime, but they do 
exercise significant censorship functions. 
 
There was an initial victory for Wingrove at the then Strasbourg Commission, which 
deemed the UK in breach of Article 10. The ECtHR, however, found for the UK 
Government. The judgment stated that there had been no violation of Wingrove’s 
freedom of artistic expression.  The Court accepted the view that the UK government 
was entitled to consider the impugned measure necessary in a democratic society.  In 
the sphere of morals or especially, religion, the margin of appreciation is quite wide. 
 
In scholarly writings on the balance of rights reached by the BBFC, the ECtHR in 
Wingrove were seen as disappointing.  Voorhoof41 explains that the European Court 
did not rely on a survey of existing legislation in other European countries which 
could have perhaps countered the arguments of the UK government.  Legislation on 
blasphemy exists only in few other European countries and those laws are rarely used.  
Strasbourg also missed the opportunity to explore the well-known inconsistency in the 
English law on blasphemy, which only extends to the Christian religion.  Neither did 
the Court estimate the measure as disproportionate, even though it amounted to a total 
ban of the film.  The European Court was persuaded that the values the BBFC and 
domestic law were trying to protect took priority over the concerns of freedom of 
expression.  Prior restraint in this case was considered as necessary, because 
otherwise in practice, the film would escape any form of control by the authorities.  
 
We provide a second example.  Self-regulatory bodies’ exercise of their powers and 
the limitations they place on fundamental rights continued to be subject to Strasbourg 
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review.  In Peck v. the United Kingdom,42 the applicant, Geoffrey Peck, had attempted 
suicide by cutting his wrists with a kitchen knife in Brentwood High Street in 1995. 
He had lost his job and his partner was terminally ill.  His actions were caught on 
CCTV and an operator alerted the police.  The police took Peck to a police station and 
he received medical help.  The footage was broadcast and frames appeared on 
newspapers.  Peck complained to the UK broadcast regulators BSC and ITC, and to 
the UK PCC.  The broadcast regulators upheld Peck’s complaints.  The UK PCC, on 
the other hand, rejected it.  Peck applied for judicial review of the press self-
regulatory body, but this was rejected.  He complained to Strasbourg.  The European 
Court found that in the UK there was no adequate protection for privacy (Article 8 of 
the ECHR) as the self-regulatory and statutory regulators did not offer sufficient 
redress: 
 
The Court finds that the lack of legal power of the commissions to award 
damages to the applicant means that those bodies could not provide an 
effective remedy to him.  It notes that the ITC’s power to impose a fine on the 
relevant television company does not amount to an award of damages to the 
applicant.  While the applicant was aware of the Council’s disclosures prior to 
“Yellow Advertiser” article of February 1996 and the BBC broadcasts, neither 
the BSC not the PCC had the power to prevent such publications or 
broadcasts.43 
 
We have seen that self-regulation operates in an area of freedom of choice associated 
with the sphere of the private.  We have observed that via self-regulation limitations 
on speech rights can be introduced, and had those limitations been applied by law or a 
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statutory regulator challenges could be mounted on the basis of breach of fundamental 
rights.  It seems, therefore, that self-regulatory mechanisms and codes are less 
protective of individual rights.  
 
Are Self-regulatory bodies public authorities? 
 
The examples discussed above beg the question - are self-regulatory institutions 
bodies against which ECHR rights are enforceable?  The question in the UK hinges 
upon whether or not the body in question can be considered a “public authority” as 
expressed in the 1998 Human Rights Act, the statute that incorporated the ECHR into 
domestic law in the UK. In other signatory countries, there are different approaches to 
this question of how to define a public authority. Taking the UK again as a case study, 
we can ask how the dividing line between state and self-regulating bodies should be 
drawn. The reasoning of UK courts to declare the Advertising Standards Authority 
(ASA; the self-regulatory body for advertising) reviewable focuses on it being a body 
“clearly exercising a public function which, if the ASA did not exist, would no doubt 
be exercised by a (statutory office).”44  We also supply some examples from other 
jurisdictions.  
 
Editors control newspaper content, and television broadcasters likewise perform a 
gate-keeping function. But do ISPs, content ratings bodies or press councils have the 
right to interfere in this process? These questions are applicable in all the countries 
surveyed.  We do object to regulators, states and governmental bodies getting 
involved in the filtering process behind publication if that results in free expression 
rights being curtailed without transparency and due process. We object because 
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interference in the marketplace of ideas by state authorities should be subject to the 
strongest inspection, as the marketplace enables democratic pluralism and debate 
about competing truth claims. Clearly, the extent to which a self-regulatory body – be 
it a press council, a video games or internet content rating body – is viewed as a state 
or, in UK HRA terms, a “public authority” is important to freedom of expression. 
 
If one’s view of freedom of expression defines it negatively – i.e. as the absence of 
state interference, then support for self-regulatory bodies will generally be viewed as 
conducive to speech freedom. At one level this is a technical question. EU member 
states all have a slightly different framework for assessing whether a body is to be 
considered a public authority and therefore whether Convention rights such as the 
right to free expression are enforceable against them.  A parallel question arises with 
regard to which bodies are subject to the binding effects of EU directives.  According 
to Craig and De Burca “a body which has been made responsible for providing a 
public service under the control of the State is included within the Community 
definition of a public body. Case law since then has not notably clarified the situation 
but has left it to the national courts to apply the loose criteria.”45 
 
How the question of applicability is resolved will have a fundamental impact on the 
nature of self-regulatory bodies, and their responsibilities to uphold freedom of 
expression. Taking the example of the UK, section 6 of the Human Rights Act makes 
it unlawful for a public authority to act incompatibly with Convention rights including 
Article 10. This applies to both pure public authorities such as statutory regulators, 
government departments and the police and also ‘functional public authorities’ which 
combine public and private functions. The upshot of this is that if industry self-
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regulatory bodies take on more public functions they will eventually trigger a greater 
responsibility to uphold freedom of expression and other convention rights. Should 
they fail to do so they could face judicial review under Article 10.   
 
In the case Selisto v. Finland (2004) the ECtHR accepted that the exercise of the 
freedoms guaranteed by Article 10 carries with it “duties and responsibilities” for a 
journalist as the statements made in an article may affect the reputation and rights of 
private persons.  And these duties and responsibilities may be established by self-
regulation and contained in a code of journalistic ethics. In the Court’s own words: 
“By reason of the “duties and responsibilities” inherent in the exercise of freedom of 
expression, the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in relation to reporting 
on issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith 
in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of 
journalism”. 46 
  
The converse theoretically also applies, with more worrying consequences. As 
regulatory functions are shifted from public authorities to private ones, the public may 
have fewer, if any opportunities for redress on Convention rights such as Article 10. 
Put simply, the actions of self-regulatory bodies could fall outside the scope of ECHR 
protection. However, member states of the Strasbourg system are under an obligation 
under Article 1 of the ECHR to ensure the effectiveness of the freedoms contained in 
the Convention.  If self-regulation is not effective the state cannot absolve itself from 
responsibility by delegating to private bodies or individuals.47  The key is the 
adequate balance of the different interests: “Restrictions on the information flow due 
to self-regulation may, however, qualify as legal restrictions under Art. 10 (2), hence 
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rendering the state liable for not guaranteeing the fundamental right of journalists and 
the public’s right to receive information and ideas on matters of crucial 
importance.”48 
 
There is no evidence that sufficient thought has been given to this issue by self-
regulatory authorities or by those who fund them or in the broader policy framework. 
At present, there is some dispute regarding criteria for deciding whether a body is to 
be considered a public authority. In the UK for example, the Parliamentary 
Committee on Human Rights has recently expressed concern that the constitution and 
organisation of the Authority, rather than the public nature of the function performed 
determines whether a body is public or not. In such a context, the gradual transfer of 
control over regulation of content to privately funded bodies would result in a lack of 
remedy or reviewability of those decisions. Technically, the shift of emphasis might 
lead to a decline in freedom of expression cases. So the simple example of reducing 
risk of challenge by adopting self-regulation rather than statutory regulation – to use 
the example cited by Angela Campbell (1998) – would be a solution that masks an 
overall reduction in protection against the actions of regulators. In this view a shift to 
self-regulation could lead to an overall diminishment of protection and redress, rather 
than an improved climate of free expression.  
 
The Government and self-regulation 
 
It is a cliché to say that self-regulatory institutions often find themselves in a 
relationship of threat and response with governments. Many self-regulatory codes are 
written with the express aim of heading off potential statutory regulation and in many 
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cases governments go as far as drafting model self-regulatory codes to stimulate 
‘spontaneous’ action by industry. This was the case recently in Italy, where the 
Department of Communications took the initiative in convening a stakeholder group 
from the Internet industry and drafting a code of conduct that would be ‘voluntarily’ 
applied by ISPs. Leaving aside the strategic problems with this approach (in terms of 
legitimacy and sustainability of codes) it also raises the interesting case of when self-
regulatory institutions cease to be self-regulatory because they are effectively 
government-sanctioned bodies. Whilst the Italian code as originally drafted was not 
implemented by the stakeholders, it would have been an interesting case were it 
implemented. Not only was the code essentially imposed on the industry by 
Government, but the code itself essentially consisted not in a set of agreed voluntary 
standards, but a summary of existing statutory standards, i.e. a guide to compliance 
with existing law. It seems unlikely that such a code – were it enforced - would be 
viewed as a pure form of self-regulation. In fact, it was largely rejected by the Italian 
ISP industry in its original form.  Frydman and Rorive49 argue for the Internet 
industry itself to self-regulate according to international standards. Under the 
European E-Commerce Directive, Internet Service Providers, to avoid potential 
liability, must take down illegal content that they are hosting, if notified of its 
presence. The liability of ISPs for third party content is an example of indirect public 
ordering. Since the ISP is not the originator of the speech the freedom of expression 
protections are not engaged by imposing liability on them rather than directly on the 
speaker. The difficulty with this approach (as we have seen above) is that ISPs might 
be too willing to avoid liability and hence be too quick at taking down material, 
thereby curtailing speech. The fact that the interaction will be in the realm of private 
law (limited as to whether the take down violated the contract between the user 
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posting material and the ISP rather than as regards the broader constitutional 
implications of limiting free speech) might  result in chilling effects on free 
speech.50 51 
 
The ECHR requires limitations on speech to be ‘prescribed by law’ as well as 
‘necessary in democratic society’. Whilst this aspect of the role of communications 
self-regulation is yet to be tested in court, there is clearly a scope for discussion in 
many cases as to whether certain aspects of the self and co-regulatory regime 
constitute rules that are ‘prescribed by law’. At one end of a continuum purely 
voluntary ethics codes of single companies are clearly not law, but at the other, codes 
that are encouraged through a legislative framework but administered by an industry 
association may be considered for these purposes to be law. 
 
 
Justification for limitations imposed on freedom of expression by self-regulatory 
mechanisms: Important procedural considerations to ensure accountability: 
transparency, openness, due process, stakeholder participation 
 
Free speech considerations, as set out in Article 10, constitute a yardstick of first 
principles in the field of media regulation. Although it is arguable the extent to which 
the “horizontal effect” of the ECHR applies (i.e. its application between private 
parties, or between a private party and a self-regulatory body)52, it is clear that self-
regulatory bodies of the media must act in a way that is compatible with the 
provisions of the ECHR. Their activities – and codes and methods of implementation 
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– are to be measured, ultimately, against the free speech standards contemplated in the 
ECHR.  
 
For the ECtHR there must be “expression” and a “restriction”.  The triple test53 
applied by the European Court of Human Rights in the field of free speech is as 
follows: 
 
- Is the restriction “prescribed by law” (Art. 10 (2) ECHR)? Law means written 
or unwritten law.  (The common law member states of the Council of Europe 
would have been discriminated against, as explained in the Sunday Times 
Case (No. 1)54 if an institution such as contempt of court would have been 
declared not to satisfy the conditions of accessibility and foreseeability of an 
interference “prescribed by law” for the sole reason that it was not set down 
in statutory form.55)  
- Is there a legitimate aim in the restriction placed on freedom of expression?  
There is a list of enumerated reasons in the case law of ECtHR, for example 
the restrictions based on the protection of public morals placed on 
pornography.56 
- Is the restriction proportional to the aim sought by the authorities? Is the limit 
necessary in a democratic society?  Free speech concerns are balanced with 
opposing interests. 
 
On the other hand, to prevent unlimited discretion on the part of self-regulatory 
bodies, it is of great relevance that good practices are adopted in their decision 
making and other activities. Good practices make the action of those bodies less likely 
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to hamper freedom of speech beyond the threshold of an interference deemed 
“necessary in a democratic society”.  Let us now focus on the guidelines for good 
(self-) regulatory practice discussed in more detail in chapters concerned with sectoral 
analysis in this report: 
 
- External involvement in the design and operation of the self-regulatory 
scheme. Two examples will illustrate this point of good practice.  In the case 
of the video games industry the now dominant model for self-regulation on a 
pan-European level is the PEGI rating system (the Pan European Games 
Information), whose rating system was a result of a period of collaboration 
and negotiation between stakeholders from national self-regulatory 
organizations and the industry, and the project also received either advice or 
support from major video console manufacturers, experts in the field, and 
relevant stakeholders within the European Commission.   Another example of 
ratings is the “Platform for Internet Content Selection – PICS” which has the 
same shortcomings as any ratings system.57 
 
- Strong stakeholder involvement. The Catalan Information Council had strong 
stakeholder involvement from its inception. This grassroots initiative by the 
Union of Journalists of Catalonia included members of civil society in all 
stages of its creation and functioning. At launch, the voluntary and consensual 
character of the council and code was emphasised and formalised by the 
signature of a document of creation; the council was established for a limited 
but renewable period of time. The agreement involves the provision of 
support, cooperation and financial support to the Council, a promise to accept 
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its moral authority and its decisions.  Stakeholder participation fosters 
“ownership” of the self-regulatory mechanism, increases its legitimacy, 
compliance and effectiveness, and from the point of view of free speech 
concerns shows the mechanism in an altogether better light, which may well 
prevent challenges.  The limits imposed via decisions taken by self-regulatory 
body may be more likely considered as being within an acceptable field of 
discretion which does not breach fundamental rights. 
 
- Independence from the industry. The key to achieving this lies in the 
membership of the board and the sources of financial support. To avoid the 
creation of a ‘corporative’ body members of the public must be included in the 
main board. In the case of the UK PCC there is a majority of lay members and 
minority of senior editors from across the industry (one of the advantages 
claimed for self-regulation is expertise), and an independent chairman who is 
appointed by the industry, but not engaged or connected with the industry. 
 
- Representation of consumers. Press councils, for example, are not simply 
mechanisms for industry self-monitoring, and a way of opening up the 
mechanism is by means of including members of the public in their boards.   
Although one of the advantages claimed for self-regulation is industry 
expertise, the inclusion of makes the bodies less ‘corporative’ and 
distinguishes press councils from the tribunals created at professional 
organisations.  In the case of the UK PCC and other press councils there is a 
majority of lay members and minority of industry representatives.  The 
approaches of the press councils differs as to, for example, the background of 
PCMLP- IAPCODE  
 429 
the members.  Legal knowledge is deemed of importance at some councils, for 
example, the chair is filled by lawyers in the Netherlands or Sweden.  In the 
case of the UK, the PCC has a chairman appointed by the industry, but who is 
not engaged or connected with the industry.   
 
- Well publicised rules and/or complaints procedure: an example of good 
practice to ensure good communication of standards is NICAM, in which the 
Dutch government worked with industry to raise the profile of the newly 
introduced system and inform the parents about the meaning of the different 
age categories and content descriptors. As successful branding of NICAM’s 
Kijkijzer symbols and the public campaign behind it have been credited as 
crucial factors in determining the future not only of NICAM but also, possibly, 
of other self-regulatory schemes in media classification.  Another example of 
good communication (and of stakeholder involvement, and incidentally 
showing that these guidelines are intertwined) can be found in the discussion 
on self-regulation in mobile communication.   The UK Code was drafted by a 
committee.58 Informal consultation with content providers, infrastructure and 
handset suppliers and government at national and European Commission 
levels took place. The UK operators present included all four of the largest 
pan-European operators. A draft was presented for public consultation prior to 
the full publication of the Code in January 2004. 
 
- Updating the scheme: an example is the UK PCC where the Code of Practice 
is under constant review.   
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- Reporting and publication requirements placed on self-regulatory bodies.  A 
standard for transparency of regulation is the publication of basic regulatory 
data on websites. Our survey on ISPs shows that there are many examples of 
good practice in this regard, such as active internet self-regulatory hotlines.  In 
the case of the print media, we praised the completeness of information 
available on websites such as the UK PCC or the German Presserat.  There are 
also areas of the self-regulatory regimes that remain opaque and therefore it is 
difficult to gain an accurate picture of the overall level of self-regulatory 
activity. The Luxembourg Press Council is an example of an information-poor 
website.  Ample disclosure of information is a good practice to enhance 
consumer trust. 
 
 
Conclusions: The Privatisation of Censorship? 
 
We close this chapter by posing again the question with which we began - “Does 
media self-regulation advance or impede freedom of expression?” The answer 
depends upon issues such as how the powers of the self-regulatory institutions are in 
fact used as well as the strength and nature of the limitations that are being imposed 
on speech. We also need to make a clear distinction between freedom of expression in 
narrow legal terms and in practice. A blanket condemnation of self-regulation for 
being contaminated by the seed of censorship is as mistaken as the view that 
welcomes self-regulation on the sole grounds that it means (or appears to mean) less 
governmental intervention.  
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We have identified the possibility of a clash between the freedom of expression rights 
such as they are laid out in Article 10 of the ECHR, and the limitations on speech 
imposed by self-regulatory bodies.  We acknowledge the tension that there is between 
the expediency and advantages offered by an industry self-regulating versus the need 
to take the limits imposed by the contractual and voluntary self-regulatory bodies 
seriously whenever they engage speech rights.  We have tried to move the debate to 
the legal arena, beyond arguments of the left that believes self-regulation privatises 
censorship and that of the right that self-regulation means less government.   
 
Once we see that self-regulation and freedom of speech need not necessarily be in 
opposition, a more constructive policy debate on the components that make up a self- 
or a co-regulatory regime can take place. From our analysis it emerges that self-
regulatory bodies have the technical expertise which seems particularly relevant in a 
field in which there is fast technological change.  Efficiency reasons justify regulatory 
decisions being taken at lower levels and in a decentralised manner, with courts being 
able to examine the correctness of the decision making process in case of complaints, 
thus ensuring that the protection of the law has opportunities to become effective.  
Procedural considerations are of great relevance.  Regulatory decisions are 
strengthened by transparency in decision making and stakeholder participation. Curbs 
on free speech are justifiable when, for example, the balance of rights as set out in 
Article 10 is accomplished by bodies not only following, but which are seen to be 
following, impartial and legitimate procedures. This answer may be, however, too 
narrowly technical. 
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There are therefore two ways to answer the general question we posed at the 
beginning of this chapter. In legal terms the response is that whether curbs placed on 
free speech by self-regulation are justifiable depends on a number of variables.  For 
example, the categorisation of self-regulatory institutions, their functions, and the 
extent to which they can be deemed as public/state authorities or if private, the extent 
to which their margin of action falls within contract or public law and the extent to 
which they could be subject to review by a higher authority.  Even though this 
approach is useful in that it illustrates the basic legal concern with state and public 
authorities as well as the need to place fundamental (or constitutional) safeguards on 
any limitation of free speech, the answer may be ultimately unsatisfactory.  The law is 
not clear, as the degree of “horizontal protection” offered by ECHR for example (i.e. 
protection of speech rights against private bodies by controlling the restrictions placed 
on freedom of expression) has yet to be defined.   
 
This research highlighted key background justifications that would be brought into 
play by courts and other bodies called upon to adjudicate in this new, fast-changing 
sector. What is abundantly clear is the need for caution as regards the free expression 
implications of the current embrace of self-regulation, in other words, the margin of 
the acceptable in terms of private regulation via contractual and volunteer devices. 
The second way to answer the question we posed at the beginning of this chapter is by 
adopting a pragmatic and procedural case-by-case approach to those functions in 
regulation which were deemed by policy makers as more appropriately undertaken by 
private bodies.  We argue that expedience should not dominate policy choices, and if 
self-regulation is an advantageous procedure for decision-making and control, then it 
is its implementation – including how due process considerations are taken into 
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account – that will determine whether freedom of expression concerns are sufficiently 
respected.   
 
What constitutes expression worthy of protection has been a new battleground with 
the rise of the internet. The promise of the internet, particularly to bring freedom of 
expression to closed societies, has brought with it a sometimes healthy scepticism of 
internet policy per-se: ‘the best internet policy is no internet policy’ we were told in 
the first years of the net. Our approach to freedom of expression has overwhelmingly 
focused on protecting negative rights, i.e. freedom from control as censorship. Most 
discussion of media freedom on the internet remains focused on a case-by-case 
negative rights discussion. This is not to deny the importance of this: in conflict 
prevention and democratic transitions the role of the internet is crucial. 
 
Freedom from59 control, particularly state control, is absolutely necessary in 
protecting broader freedom on the internet. The question we would like to pose is 
whether it is sufficient. We must keep protecting the net from censorship. But we 
must not neglect the positive conditions for media freedom, nor should we be 
distracted by the crusade against censorship to the extent that we view the creation of 
any rules, or any dispute resolution as ‘the thin end of the wedge’.  Is it possible to 
identify rules that are steps on the slippery slope from those that are not? As Hosein 
put it discussing the Communications Decency Act: “It is a case of the ever-
articulated “slippery slope” argument: if you begin with one form of content 
regulation, even with the most noble intents the rest will naturally follow. Other forms 
of regulation will arise either intentionally, using the “verification” technologies to 
verify someone’s geographic location to prevent access to non-indecent information, 
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or less directly through the chilling of online speech for fear of surveillance or 
eventual censoring”60.  Hosein takes some rather large steps in that paragraph. Whilst 
we can say that there is a danger of, as he calls it ‘chipping away at the marketplace 
for ideas’, we need to be more specific about which forms of intervention and rule-
setting are steps onto this slippery slope, and which are not.   In order to assess the 
value or the threat posed by new developments such as co-regulatory search level, 
internet filtering of the kind being experimented in the UK, Norway and Finland, we 
have to reach beyond the shrill opposition between rules and freedom posed in much 
of the debate. We need to acknowledge that rules can also open up spaces, and grow 
the space for debate. We also need to look beyond the law and return to the 
philosophical justifications of media freedom more generally: the arguments from 
truth, democracy and self expression. Some rules genuinely do place us on a slippery 
slope to censorship, but others certainly do not.  
 
Freedom to is also crucial. Free communication on the internet will itself depend on 
maintenance of an open internet. Real media freedom requires access and capabilities, 
content that can be easily shared, and public fora used by wide and overlapping 
communities of interest. There are various forms of rulemaking going on on the 
internet, some private and some state led, some led by users themselves. It is the 
interplay between these public and private, voluntary and obligatory rules that will 
determine the future scope of freedom on the internet. 
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